Appeals

Jan. 6 rioters challenge their indictment for violating 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2), which makes it a crime to "corruptly . . . obstruct, influence, or impede any official proceeding." District court: Agreed. Indictment dismissed because 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(1) is all about destroying evidence, so (c)(2) can't extend to hitting Capitol police officers. D.C. Circuit: Yes, it can. Concurrence: It can, but only if we adopt a narrow interpretation of "corruptly"; otherwise, the law is breathtakingly broad.

Cleveland, Ohio man is sentenced in 1991 for a murder he claims he didn't commit. In 2016, the Ohio Innocence Project takes an interest in his case and files multiple public-records requests for case documents. Assistant prosecutor Barbara Rhodes Marburger turns over a heavily redacted file. Several months later, the city of Cleveland produces the unredacted file. Guess what the prosecutor redacted: a bunch of "significant exculpatory evidence" that was never revealed to the man's defense attorneys! He is released after 27 years in prison and sues the prosecutor.

If you're charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm but you don't know you're a felon, are you really a felon in possession of a firearm? Fourth Circuit: Nope, not according to the Supreme Court. That means our friend the accused should get his day in court—oh, but he still has to show prejudice (or actual innocence) to win if he procedurally defaulted (even if the gov't forgot to bring up that little detail). Concurrence: Eh, mostly agree.

After his indictment on drug conspiracy charges, man's arrest warrant mysteriously vanishes from the FBI's database. Human error? A technical glitch? Divine intervention? Eighth Circuit: Shrugs. We'll never know. But what we do know is his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial was not violated by the eight-month delay that resulted because man did not show any particularized prejudice. Conviction affirmed.

Via the Seventh Circuit: In which the defendant's connection to Jared Fogle isn't even close to the fascinating part of the story, which for now results in a remand to determine whether Indiana State Police altered a search warrant to add "bestiality" before or after the judge signed it.

The U.S. Supreme Court declined on Monday to examine the constitutionality of a criminal contempt conviction for disbarred human rights lawyer Steven Donziger that was obtained by court-appointed prosecutors, prompting a dissent from Justice Neil Gorsuch, who decried the broken "constitutional promise" of having separation between judges and prosecutors (view full order).  

Man calls 911 to report that a store clerk pulled a gun on him, threatened him, and taunted him with racial slurs. When Saginaw, Mich. police arrive, they arrest the man(!) him for filing a false police report. He spends 18 days in jail before being released and all charges against him are dropped. Man sues for false arrest. Police: We get qualified immunity. Sixth Circuit: No, you don't.

Fourth Circuit (2021): This petitioner's South Carolina state court death sentence was defective because his trial counsel failed to present mitigating evidence during sentencing. We relied on evidence introduced in his federal habeas proceedings. Supreme Court (2022): Dear circuit court, reconsider your judgment in light of Shinn v. Martinez Ramirez, where we said you can't do that. Fourth Circuit (2023): Fine.

Former federal inmate, a devout Muslim, sues under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, alleging that when he would try to perform his required daily prayers during shift breaks at the prison commissary where he worked, prison guards—who also said "There is no good Muslim but a dead Muslim" and put a sticker on his back reading "I love pork bacon"—would follow him and deliberately interfere by making noises, talking loudly, and kicking boxes. Guards: We're entitled to qualified immunity. I mean,  what gov't official could possibly know that violated the law?

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), a court is authorized to grant a reduction in sentence, commonly referred to as “compassionate release,” if three requirements are met. First, the offender must exhaust administrative remedies in BOP. Second, the offender must demonstrate “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for a sentence reduction. Third, the court must find that relief is warranted under the section 3553(a) sentencing factors (the statute also provides that a reduction must be consistent with “applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission”).