Today, the United States Supreme Court unanimously held that Congress did not clearly authorize convictions under both 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A)(i) and (j) for a single act that violates both provisions. One act that violates both provisions therefore may spawn only one conviction. See Barrett v. United States, No. 24-5774 (Jan. 1, 2026).
Petitioner Dwayne Barrett was convicted by jury in the Southern District of New York on one count of conspiring to commit Hobbs Act robbery (18 U.S.C. § 1951); two counts of Hobbs Act robbery (18 U.S.C. § 19851); three counts of carrying and using a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A); and one count of murder using a firearm during a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. § 924(j)(1)). His convictions and 90-year sentence were affirmed by the Second Circuit, but vacated by the Supreme Court and remanded in light of United States v. Davis, 588 U.S. 445 (2019).
On remand, the Second Circuit vacated the § 924(c) conviction predicated on conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery in light of Davis. The district court resentenced petitioner to 50 years of imprisonment—20 years’ imprisonment on the conspiracy and robbery counts, plus 5 years of imprisonment for § 924(c), and 25 years of imprisonment for § 924(j) (each concerning a different robbery). The district court did not impose a separate § 924(c) sentence stemming from the murder, reasoning the §§ 924(c) and (j) convictions “merged into one sentence because one’s a lesser included of the other.” The Second Circuit reversed, ruling that the §§ 924(c) and (j) convictions stemming from the same murder did not merge; thus, imposing separate sentences for both would not run afoul of the Double Jeopardy Clause. The circuit ordered petitioner resentenced.
Justice Jackson delivered the opinion of the unanimous court, except as to Part IV-C, joined only by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor and Kagan. The Court’s opinion summarizes the issue and holding like this:
This case concerns the relationship between two provisions of 18 U. S. C. §924. The first, §924(c)(1)(A)(i), criminalizes using, carrying, or possessing a firearm in connection with a federal crime of violence or drug trafficking crime. The second, §924(j), prescribes different penalties— including, in certain circumstances, capital punishment— when “a violation of subsection (c)” causes death.
Every defendant subject to subsection (j) has also, necessarily, violated subsection (c). We consider here whether a defendant who commits a single act that violates both §924(c)(1)(A)(i) and §924(j) may be convicted only under one provision or the other, or instead may suffer two convictions.
All agree on the first step of the analysis: Subsection (c)(1)(A)(i) and subsection (j) define the same offense under the test set forth in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U. S. 299 (1932). That consensus carries us most of the way to resolving this case, as we have long presumed that Congress intends to authorize only one conviction per offense.
Justice Gorsuch filed a separate concurring opinion.
Briefing on the merits is available on the Supreme Court’s docket here.
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