In forty-eight States and the federal government, a single juror's vote to acquit is enough to prevent a conviction. But Louisiana and Oregon have long permitted convictions on 10-2 jury verdicts, well before nonunanimous verdicts were endorsed by a pair of 1972 non-capital Supreme Court opinions, Apodcaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (plurality opinion) and Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972).
Today, the United States Supreme Court decided Ramos v. Louisiana, No. 18-5924 (Apr. 20, 2020), holding that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial--as incorporated against the States by way of the Fourteenth Amendment--requires a unanimous verdict to convict a defendant of a serious offense.
Petitioner Ramos was convicted in Louisiana of a serious crime based on a 10-2 jury verdict and sentenced to life without parole. He objected to his conviction as a denial of his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. The state courts affirmed. The United States Supreme Court reversed Ramos' conviction in a lengthy and splintered opinion:
GORSUCH, J., announced the judgment of the Court, and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II-A, III, and IV-B-1, in which GINSBURG, BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined, an opinion with respect to Parts II-B, IV-B-2, and V, in which GINSBURG, BREYER, and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Part IV-A, in which GINSBURG and BREYER, JJ., joined. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed an opinion concurring as to all but Part IV-A. KAVANAUGH, J., filed an opinion concurring in part. THOMAS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. ALITO, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ROBERTS, C. J., joined, and in which KAGAN, J., joined as to all but Part III-D.
While the justices various opinions disagree on many legal points, Justice Gorsuch concludes his opinion with this important insight:
On what ground would anyone have us leave Mr. Ramos in prison for the rest of his life? Not a single Member of this Court is prepared to say Louisiana secured his conviction constitutionally under the Sixth Amendment. No one before us suggests that the error was harmless. Louisiana does not claim precedent commands an affirmance. In the end, the best anyone can seem to muster against Mr. Ramos is that, if we dared to admit in his case what we all know to be true about the Sixth Amendment, we might have to say the same in some others. But where is the justice in that? Every judge must learn to live with the fact he or she will make some mistakes; it comes with the territory. But it is something else entirely to perpetuate something we all know to be wrong only because we fear the consequences of being right. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Reversed.
Beyond denouncing a fear of too much justice, Justice Gorsuch explicates the racist origins of non-unanimous jury verdicts in Louisiana and Oregon. Louisiana's non-unanimous jury verdict was born in its 1898 constitutional convention, "the avowed purpose of that convention was to 'establish the supremacy of the white race.'" "With a careful eye on racial demographics, the convention delegates sculpted a 'facially race-neutral' rule permitting 10-to-2 verdicts in order 'to ensure that African-American juror service would be meaningless.'" Oregon's adoption of its non-unanimous jury verdict rule "can be similarly traced to the rise of the Ku Klux Clan and efforts to dilute 'the influence of racial, ethnic, and religious minorities on Oregon juries." Indeed, "courts in both Louisiana and Oregon have frankly acknowledged that race was a motivating factor in the adoption of their State's respective non-unanimity rules."
Briefing on the merits in Ramos is available on the Supreme Court's website here.