Today, a unanimous Supreme Court held that restitution under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 (MVRA) is plainly criminal punishment for purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause. Ellinger v. United States, No. 24-482 (Jan. 20, 2026).
Justice Kavanaugh delivered the unanimous opinion of the court. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Gorsuch. The Court’s opening paragraphs summarize the relevant facts and holding:
Under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996, defendants convicted of certain federal crimes must pay monetary restitution to the victims. That Act, known as the MVRA, became law on April 24, 1996. Petitioner Ellingburg was sentenced later in 1996 and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $7,567.25. He has not yet satisfied that obligation.
Ellingburg has now raised an Ex Post Facto Clause challenge to his continued restitution obligation because he committed his crime before the enactment of the MVRA. The Ex Post Facto Clause issue turns in part on the threshold question of whether restitution under the MVRA is criminal punishment. Applying Circuit precedent, the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit concluded that restitution under the MVRA is not criminal punishment. 113 F. 4th 839, 841–842 (2024). We now reverse.
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When determining whether a law violates the Ex Post Facto Clause, the Court must evaluate whether the law imposes a criminal or penal sanction as opposed to a civil remedy. Assessing whether “a statutory scheme is civil or criminal is first of all a question of statutory construction” that requires the Court to “consider the statute’s text and its structure.” Smith v. Doe, 538 U. S. 84, 92 (2003) (quotation marks omitted). Here, the statutory analysis is straightforward: Restitution under the MVRA is plainly criminal punishment for purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause.
(footnotes omitted). The oral argument recording and transcript are available here; merits briefing here; and the Eighth Circuit’s opinion below here.
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