Today, the Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit in an important win for federal prisoners seeking collateral relief. See Bowe v. United States, No. 24538 (Jan. 9, 2026) opinion.
In 2008, Mr. Bowe was convicted of a gun charge under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and was sentenced to a mandatory consecutive term of ten years in federal prison. That conviction depended on Section 924(c)’s definition of a “crime of violence.” In 2019, the Supreme Court invalidated a key component of Section 924(c)’s definition, known as the “residual clause,” as unconstitutionally vague. United States v. Davis, 588 U.S. 445 (2019).
Because he had previously filed a motion to vacate based on a different claim before Davis was decided, Mr. Bowe was required to satisfy the restrictions on “second or successive” motions to vacate under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). The Eleventh Circuit dismissed Mr. Bowe’s request because, although he satisfied other AEDPA requirements (such as demonstrating a new constitutional rule of law that was retroactive), his conviction still satisfied a different component of § 924(c)’s definition of “crime of violence” under the elements clause of then-existing Eleventh Circuit precedent.
A few years later, the Supreme Court invalidated the Eleventh Circuit’s elements clause precedent, eliminating any possible basis for Mr. Bowe’s 924(c) conviction. United States v. Taylor, 596 U.S. 845 (2022). Mr. Bowe returned to the Eleventh Circuit to request authorization to raise his Davis claim. The Eleventh Circuit dismissed his request again based on different AEDPA rule that requires dismissal of any claim that was “presented in a prior application,” even though that rule only applies to state prisoners.
The Supreme Court reversed 5 to 4. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Jackson. The Court framed and decided two issues in favor of Mr. Bowe this way:
This case presents two questions regarding which aspects of §2244 fall within the scope of §2255(h)’s cross-reference. The first is whether §2244(b)(3)(E), which prohibits the “denial of an authorization by a court of appeals to file a second or successive application” from being the “subject of a petition for . . . a writ of certiorari,” bars this Court’s review of authorization decisions concerning the motions of federal prisoners. If it does, this Court would lack jurisdiction to hear this case.
The Court holds that it does not. In the narrow cross-reference to the procedures in §2244, Congress has not clearly indicated that it intended to incorporate §2244(b)(3)(E)’s certiorari bar. The second question is whether §2244(b)(1), which directs courts to dismiss a claim “presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was presented in a prior application,” applies to motions filed by federal prisoners. It does not: Section 2244(b)(1), by its express terms, applies only to state prisoners’ habeas applications under §2254, not to federal prisoners’ motions under §2255.
Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Thomas and Alito, and in part by Justice Barrett.
Congratulations to Assistant Federal Defenders Andrew Adler and Janice Bergmann and their team, including the MacArthur Justice Center, in successfully fighting to prevent courts from departing from AEDPA’s text to create new restrictions on federal prisoners’ ability to seek post-conviction relief in federal court.
Briefing on the merits is available on the Supreme Court’s docket here.
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