1 2 3 4 5 6	AMY M. KARLIN (Bar No. 150016) Interim Federal Public Defender BRIANNA FULLER MIRCHEFF (Bar No. 243641) (E-Mail: Brianna Mircheff@fd.org) Deputy Federal Public Defender 321 East 2nd Street Los Angeles, California 90012-4202 Telephone: (213) 894-4784 Facsimile: (213) 894-0081 Attorneys for Defendant EDER J. CORTEZ-ZELAYA	
8	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT	
9	DISTRICT OF GUAM	
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11	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,	Case No. 1:14-cr-00009-2_
12	Plaintiff,	Ninth Circuit Case No. 17-10192
13	V.	17-10192
14	EDER J. CORTEZ-ZELAYA,	APPLICATION FOR BAIL PENDING APPEAL
15	Defendant.	TENDING ATTEAL
16		
17	Defendant Eder Cortez-Zelaya, by and through his counsel of record, Deputy	
18	Federal Public Defender Brianna Mircheff, applies to this Honorable Court for bail	
19	pending appeal. This application is based on 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b), the attached	
20	Memorandum of Points and Authorities, all files and records in this case, and any	
21	further evidence as may be adduced at the hearing on this application.	
22	The government opposes this request.	
23	Respectfully submitted,	
24	AMY M. KARLIN	
25	Interim Federal Public Defender	
26	DATED: March 21, 2020 By /s/Brianna Fuller Mircheff BRIANNA FULLER MIRCHEFF	
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28	Dep	uty Federal Public Defender

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

Mr. Cortez-Zelaya was convicted four drug-related counts after trial. His appeal is currently pending, but the government has already conceded that Mr. Cortez-Zelaya should receive a new trial on Count One, the most serious count in the indictment. Based on this concession, he satisfies the first requirement for bail pending appeal. 18 U.S.C. 3143(b)(1)(B)(ii). Moreover, by demonstrating perfect compliance with the conditions of supervision for eight months, including getting himself from Nevada to Guam for trial, he has proved that he is neither a flight risk nor a danger. Accordingly, Mr. Cortez-Zelaya should be released on bond pending appeal, on the conditions under which he was previously released.

I. ANALYSIS

A. Standard for Bail Pending Appeal

An individual convicted of a federal offense merits bail pending appeal if there is "clear and convincing evidence that the person is not likely to flee or pose a danger to the safety of any other person or the community if released" and if "the appeal is not for the purpose of delay and raises a substantial question of law or fact likely to result []in reversal, []an order for a new trial, []a sentence that does not include a term of imprisonment, or []a reduced sentence to a term of imprisonment less than the total of the time already served plus the expected duration of the appeal process." 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b); *United States v. Garcia*, 340 F.3d 1013, 1015 (9th Cir. 2003); *United States v. Handy*, 761 F.2d 1279, 1279-80 (9th Cir. 1985).

To satisfy the "substantial question" standard, Mr. Cortez-Zelaya need not show his appellate issues are likely to result in a reversal, new trial, or shorter sentence. Rather, "substantial' defines the level of merit required in the question presented and 'likely to result in reversal or an order for a new trial' defines the type of question that must be presented." *Handy*, 761 F.2d at 1280. "An issue is substantial if it is 'fairly debatable' or 'fairly doubtful,'that is, 'of more substance than would be necessary to a finding that it was not frivolous." *Garcia*, 340 F.3d at 1021 n.5 (quoting *Handy*, 761

F.2d at 1283).

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"The second part of the requirement—that the question be likely to result in reversal, a new trial, a non-prison sentence, or a sentence reduced to less than the time that would be served by the end of the appeal process—concerns only the type of question that meets the requirement; it does not involve assessing the likelihood that a reversal will occur in the particular case." *Garcia*, 340 F.3d at 1021 n.5 (quoting *Handy*, 761 F.2d at 1280).

Thus, the question is not whether Mr. Cortez-Zelaya's claims will ultimately be successful, but only whether his appeal presents non-frivolous issues that would result in an order for a new trial if he is ultimately successful.

Defendants convicted of an offense for which the maximum sentence is life imprisonment face one additional requirement: that it be "clearly shown that there are exceptional reasons why detention would not be appropriate." 18 U.S.C. §§ 3143(b)(2), 3142(f)(1)(B), 3145(c). Garcia, 340 F.3d at 1015. A wide range of factors may be considered in determining whether there are exceptional reasons why incarceration before a conviction and sentence are final is inappropriate. *Id.* at 1018-19. These include, for example, whether the defendant led an exemplary life prior to her offense and would likely to continue to contribute to society significantly if allowed to remain free on bail; the length of the prison term; any factors that would render prison unusually harsh for a particular defendant; the nature of the defendant's arguments on appeal; and any factors that would render the defendant's flight or danger to the community exceptionally unlikely. Id. at 1019-21. In addition, cases in which incarceration would impose risks to a defendant physical well-being may constitute exceptional circumstances warranting bail pending appeal. *Id.* at 1019-20; see also United States v. Wetselaar, 2017 WL 6514650 (9th Cir. 2017) (finding, over government objection, exceptional reasons for bail pending appeal based to defendant's illness).

Mr. Cortez-Zelaya satisfies these standards.

B. Mr. Cortez-Zelaya's Appeal Raises Non-Frivolous Questions That, Would Likely Result In A New Trial.

First, Mr. Cortez-Zelaya can demonstrate that his appeal presents a substantial question that is likely to result in an order for a new trial. The government, in its answering brief, *conceded* that a new trial was required on Count One. Government's Answering Brief, *United States v. Cortez-Zelaya*, 17-10192, at 14 (9th Cir. 2019) ("Answering Br."). This, plus the fact that the Ninth Circuit already granted a new trial to Mr. Cortez-Zelaya's co-defendant, Francisco Arias, *United States v. Arias*, 784 F. App'x 485, 488 (9th Cir. Aug. 7, 2019), establishes that Mr. Cortez-Zelaya's appeal involves a substantial question of law that is likely to result in an order for a new trial on the heaviest count.

He also raised substantial questions to his other counts of conviction. He challenged, and the government conceded, that Count Two should be remanded for entry of a judgment of acquittal. Answering Br. at 15-16. The Ninth Circuit accepted a similar concession in Mr. Cortez-Zelaya's co-defendant's case. *Arias*, 784 F. App'x at 488.

Mr. Cortez-Zelaya challenged the sufficiency and jury instructions as to the only other counts, the Travel Act counts. *See* Opening Brief, at 31-39. The government conceded that the instruction was erroneous, and only challenged whether the error was harmless. Answering Br. at 20. And the government did not contest that the prosecutor, during closing argument, misstated the law as to those convictions--again, it only contested its harmlessness. Answering Br. at 23.

There are strong arguments that the error as to the Travel Act counts are not harmless. First, there is a substantial, non-frivolous argument that the evidence as to

¹ The government also conceded in its Brief that the conviction for Count Two should be vacated, and that a new sentencing proceeding is required based on guideline calculation error.

Count Five is insufficient. The Travel Act requires, as an element, a subsequent overt act that occurs after the mailing in the case; but here, the government proved no act undertaken after the mailing alleged in Count Five. Opening Br. at 33-37. There is also a non-frivolous argument that the erroneous jury instruction and prosecutorial argument prejudiced Mr. Cortez-Zelaya. Opening Br. at 37-39.

The standard must drive the decision. The Court need only deem these arguments non-frivolous in order to find that Mr. Cortez-Zelaya has satisfied this standard. *Garcia*, 340 F.3d at 1021 n.5. All of these are non-frivolous questions that, if decided in Mr. Cortez-Zelaya's favor, would result in a new trial. He satisfies the standard for bail pending appeal.

C. Mr. Cortez-Zelaya's Release Would Not Endanger the Community, Nor Does He Present a Risk of Non-Appearance.

Moreover, Mr. Cortez-Zelaya does not present a flight risk or a danger. He was released on a personal recognizance bond on March 20, 2014, *see* Exh. A, and remained on bond until November 6, 2014, when he was convicted after trial.² During that period, he lived in Las Vegas but made arrangements to appear via videoconference for pretrial motions, and appeared in Guam for trial as well. He is a United States citizen who surrendered his passport when he was released on bond. *See* Exh. A; PSR at 3. As this Court noted at the time of the hearing, the Probation Officer confirmed that he was "abiding by all the rules, both in . . . Las Vegas, and Guam." *See* Transcript (11/6/14), Dkt. # 641, at 28. He is serving his sentence in California, and can

² At the time the Court detained him, the Court found that Mr. Cortez-Zelaya's convictions put him within the scope of 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(2), and found no substantial likelihood that a motion for new trial would be granted. Mr. Cortez-Zelaya's case now falls under 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b), but even so, the government's concession now makes it likely that a new trial will be granted.

easily return to his family in Nevada.³ He has shown this Court that he is not a flight risk or a danger if allowed to remain on release pending appeal.

D. Mr. Cortez-Zelaya Has Demonstrated Exceptional Reasons That His Continued Incarceration Is Not Appropriate.

There are three exceptional reasons that Mr. Cortez-Zelaya's continued incarceration is not appropriate. The first is the unusual circumstances of the government's concessions in this case. Mr. Cortez-Zelaya is only subject to this heightened standard because Count One has a statutory maximum of life. But the government has already conceded that the conviction on Count One must be vacated. That is an unusual and extraordinary circumstance that warrants Mr. Cortez-Zelaya's release on bond. *Garcia*, 340 F.3d at 1020 ("When there appears to be an unusually strong chance that the defendant will succeed in obtaining a reversal of his conviction on appeal he may be able to demonstrate exceptional reasons for delaying the commencement of his sentence.").

Second Mr. Cortez-Zelaya led an "exemplary life" prior to his current offense, and could, if released, continue to contribute to society if permitted to remain on bond. Mr. Cortez-Zelaya has no prior criminal history, not so much as an arrest. (PSR ¶¶ 97-99.) He was working and supporting his family until he was remanded into custody. (PSR ¶ 114.) He would continue to do so if he were released on bond. These factors "militate in favor of finding exceptional reasons." *Garcia*, 340 F.3d at 1019.

The third unusual circumstance is the risk to Mr. Cortez-Zelaya if he remains incarcerated. Even as the BOP does what it can to prevent the spread of COVID-19 through the facilities, it appears inevitable that the virus will spread throughout the prisons--and that if it does, the situation will quickly turn dire. *See* Federal prison workers say conflicting orders on coronavirus response is putting lives at risk, CBS

³ Mr. Cortez-Zelaya is in FCI Lompoc, which is about a seven hour drive from Las Vegas.

News (Mar. 19, 2020), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/coronavirus-prison-federal-employees-say-conflicting-orders-putting-lives-at-risk-2020-03-19; Danielle Ivory, "We Are Not a Hospital: A Prison Braces for the Coronavirus," N.Y. Times, March 17, 2020, https://tinyurl.com/se7emva. The BOP's protocol has no allowance for testing. See BOP Implementing Modified Operations, available https://www.bop.gov/coronavirus/covid19_status.jsp. While the BOP (as of today) reports no positive cases of COVID-19, it's unclear "what that means if people are not being tested." In the Matter of the Extradition of Manrique, 2020 WL 1307109, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2020). Meanwhile the BOP is continuing to transfer inmates between facilities using a temperature check. See BOP Implementing Modified Operations. Again, given that symptoms don't begin to appear for weeks, this, too, means that the BOP is playing "a game of catchup." Manrique, 2020 WL 1307109, at *1.

Voices in Congress are calling on the Department of Justice to "do all they can to release as many people as possible who are currently behind bars and at risk of getting sick." *See* Exh. B. Medical professionals behind bars are sounding the alarm as well. Craig McCarthy, "Top Rikers Doctor: Coronavirus 'Storm is Coming," N.Y. Post (Mar. 19, 2020) ("[W]e cannot change the fundamental nature of jail. We cannot socially distance dozens of elderly men living in a dorm, sharing a bathroom. Think of a cruise ship recklessly boarding more passengers each day. . . .Please let as many out as you possibly can."). While Mr. Cortez-Zelaya has no particular health concerns that put him in the CDC's most vulnerable band of people, at the moment 38% percent of hospitalizations are adults under the age of 54. Pam Belluck, "Younger Adults Make Up Big Portions of Coronavirus Hospitalizations," N.Y. Times (Mar. 18, 2020).

The Court can consider these fact in deciding whether or not to grant bond. *United States v. Dante Stephens*, 15-CR-95(AJN), ---F.Supp.3d---, 2020 WL 1295155 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2020). And, in fact, health risks can satisfy the exceptional circumstances standard. *See Garcia*, 340 F.3d at 1020 ("Nor do we foreclose the

possibility of finding exceptional circumstances in a case in which incarceration would impose exceptional risks on a defendant involving his physical or mental well-being-risks that might arise as a result of the nature of his crime or even as a result of his possessing certain physical, psychological, or other characteristics.").

"These are extraordinary times." *In the Matter of the Extradition of Manrique*, 2020 WL 1307109 (N.D. Cal. 2020). They are certainly an "exceptional circumstance" that warrants release in this case.

II. CONCLUSION

Mr. Cortez-Zelaya satisfies the standard for bail pending appeal under 18 U.S.C. § 3143 and should be released. He has established that his appeal presents a substantial, non-frivolous question that would result in an order for a new trial. He has established that his release does not pose a danger to the community and that he is not a risk of flight, and that exceptional reasons support his release. That is all he must do.

For the foregoing reasons, counsel requests that the Court issue an order releasing Mr. Cortez-Zelaya on bond under the terms and conditions previously imposed.

Respectfully submitted,

AMY M. KARLIN Interim Federal Public Defender

DATED: March 21, 2020 By /s/Brianna Fuller Mircheff

BRIANNA FULLER MIRCHEFF Deputy Federal Public Defender