This morning, by vote of 7 to 2, the Supreme Court held that a district court considering whether to revoke a defendant’s term of supervised release may not consider §3553(a)(2)(A), which covers retribution vis-à-vis the defendant’s underlying criminal offense. Esteras v. United States, No. 23-7438 (June 20, 2025) (opinion here).
Petitioner Edgardo Esteras pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute heroin and was sentenced to 12 months in prison followed by a 6-year term of supervised release, which was a downward variance to his 15-21 month sentencing range. While on supervised release, Esteras was arrested for domestic violence and other charges. The district court revoked Esteras’s supervised release and imposed 24 months of reimprisonment—an upward variance from the advisory 6 to 12 month range—explaining that Esteras’s earlier sentence had been “rather lenient” and that his revocation sentence must “promote respect for the law,” a consideration enumerated in 18 U. S. C. §3553(a)(2)(A). Esteras objected, arguing that the district court had impermissibly considered “the factor in Section 3553(a)(2)(A)." The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that a district court may consider §3553(a)(2)(A) when revoking supervised release.
Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Thomas, Kagan, and Kavanaugh, and in which Justices Sotomayor and Jackson joined as to all but Part II-B. Sotomayor concurred separately in part, joined by Justice Jackson. Justice Jackson also concurred separately in part. Justice Alito dissented, joined by Justice Gorsuch.
Writing for the majority, Justice Barret’s opinion starts like this:
A criminal sentence may include both time in prison and a term of supervised release. 18 U. S. C. §3583(a). Supervised release comes with conditions—for instance, the defendant must refrain from committing another crime. §3583(d). If the defendant violates one of these conditions, then the district court may revoke the term of supervised release and require reimprisonment. But a court may do so only “after considering” an enumerated list of sentencing factors: those “set forth in section 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D), (a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(6), and (a)(7).” §3583(e). Conspicuously missing from this list is §3553(a)(2)(A), which directs a district court to consider “the need for the sentence imposed” “to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense.” The Sixth Circuit held that a district court may consider that factor nonetheless.
We disagree. Congress’s decision to enumerate most of the sentencing factors while omitting §3553(a)(2)(A) raises a strong inference that courts may not consider that factor when deciding whether to revoke a term of supervised release. This inference is consistent with both the statutory structure and the role that supervised release plays in the sentencing process. Accordingly, we vacate the judgments of the Sixth Circuit and remand for further proceedings.
Briefing is available on the Supreme Court’s website here.