

2005 WL 372255 (W.D.Wis.)

[Motions, Pleadings and Filings](#)

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United States District Court,
W.D. Wisconsin.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,
v.
Benjamin A. VAUGHN, Defendant.
No. 00-CR-116-C-01, 04-C-0745-C.
Feb. 11, 2005.

[Stephen Mays](#), Mays Law Office, S.C., Madison, WI, for Defendant.
Daniel J. Graber, for Plaintiff.
Benjamin A. Vaughn, pro se.

ORDER

[CRABB, J.](#)

*1 On October 4, 2004, defendant Benjamin Vaughn filed a motion for vacation of his sentence pursuant to [28 U.S.C. § 2255](#). In his motion, defendant contends that he was sentenced illegally because the court made findings of fact concerning his offense behavior and then used those facts to enhance his sentence under the sentencing guidelines in the mistaken belief that the guidelines were mandatory. In an order dated October 14, 2004, I told defendant that his motion was untimely under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act unless he qualified to proceed under [28 U.S.C. § 2255\(3\)](#), which permits defendants to file a [§ 2255](#) "within a year of the Supreme Court's initial recognition of a newly recognized right if the right has been made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review." I told defendant that that subsection might apply to him because I understood him to be arguing that his sentence is illegal under [Blakely v. Washington, --- U.S. ----, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 \(2004\)](#) and [United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508 \(7th Cir.2004\)](#). I told him also that the Supreme Court had agreed to hear the *Booker* case and that if it were to decide that the lower courts have been acting unconstitutionally in basing sentencing determinations on facts that were not established by a jury finding, and that the right applies retroactively, then defendant's motion would be timely under [§ 2255\(3\)](#). For this reason, I ordered defendant's motion stayed pending the Supreme Court's decision.

Now the Supreme Court has rendered its opinion. In *United States v. Booker*, 04-104 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2005), it held that defendants in federal criminal cases have a right to a jury determination of any disputed factual subject that increases the maximum punishment. The Court held also that the Sentencing Guidelines are unconstitutional to the extent they require judges to base sentences on facts that are not the product of factfinding by a jury but that the guidelines are not unconstitutional if judges use them for advisory purposes. However, the Court did not address the retroactivity of its decision on cases on collateral review, leaving it uncertain whether the right has retroactive application.

Unfortunately for defendant, on February 2, 2005, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit resolved the uncertainty, at least for motions filed in this circuit asserting the right newly recognized in *Booker*. In *McReynolds v. United States*, Nos. 04-2520, 04-2632 & 04-2844, slip op. (7th Cir.), the court held that the rights recognized in *Booker* do not apply retroactively on collateral review. The court of appeals characterized the decision as a procedural one and noted that, as a general rule, procedural decisions do not apply retroactively unless they establish one of those rare "watershed rules of criminal procedure implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding." ' *Id.* at 4 (quoting [Schriro v. Summerlin, --- U.S. ----, 124 S.Ct. 2519, 159 L.Ed.2d 442 \(2004\)](#)). The court concluded that *Booker* did not establish a "watershed rule"; "the choice between judges and juries as factfinders does not make such a fundamental difference." *Id.* The court was persuaded that the *Booker* decision would not change the process of sentencing in any significant way: defendants would continue to be sentenced as they have been, with the only difference being "the degree of flexibility judges would enjoy in applying the guideline system." *Id.*

*2 Now that the court of appeals has decided that *Booker* has no retroactive application, defendant

cannot take advantage of the provision in subsection (3) of [§ 2255](#) that delays the running of the one-year limitation period until the Supreme Court has recognized a new right that has retroactive application. Instead, he is bound by the provisions of subsection (1), under which the limitations period began to run for him on May 16, 2001, when the 10- day period for filing an appeal from his judgment of conviction expired. That period expired in May of 2002.

ORDER

IT IS ORDERED that defendant Benjamin Vaughn's motion for vacation of his sentence pursuant to [28 U.S.C. § 2255](#) is DENIED as untimely.

W.D.Wis., 2005.

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- [3:04C00745](#) (Docket) (Oct. 04, 2004)
- [3:00CR00116](#) (Docket) (Dec. 13, 2000)

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